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What are fiscal rules for?
A critical analysis of the 
Argentine experience
Miguel Braun and Nicolás Gadano
This article undertakes a critical examination of the usefulness 
of fiscal responsibility laws in situations of institutional weakness. It 
analyses the case of Argentina, where prodigal use of fiscal rules (two 
different laws in just five years) contrasts with their limited effectiveness 
for fiscal policy sustainability and transparency, and it confirms that in 
situations of institutional weakness a fiscal responsibility law is unlikely 
to constrain government decision-making to the extent necessary to 
correct the behaviour of the public finances. The case of Argentina thus 
provides a warning for supporters of fiscal rules. When fiscal credibility is 
low and institutions weak, not only may such rules be fiscally ineffective, 
but non-enforcement may weaken yet further the fragile institutional 
context which made them so ineffective to begin with.
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Both theoretical studies and the recommendations of 
international organizations have borne witness to a 
growing faith in the ability of fiscal rules to contribute to 
fiscal solvency in developing countries. The theoretical 
argument evokes the scene of Ulysses and the Sirens 
quoted above, in which Ulysses asks his sailors to tie 
him to the mast to save him from succumbing to the 
lure of the Sirens’ song. Rules are seen as legal and 
institutional constraints that can prevent opportunistic 
politicians from attempting to overspend. In particular, 
rules are expected to counteract the bias towards fiscal 
deficits created by the common ownership of public 
resources, principal-agent problems and the problems 
of time inconsistency identified in recent economic 
policy publications.2
This position is an application of the “rules rather 
than discretion” principle developed by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) and is paralleled by the arguments in 
favour of central bank independence in the conduct of 
monetary policy.3 Kopits (2001), for example, argues 
that the main benefit of having a set of permanent, 
well-designed and properly implemented fiscal rules 
to prevent a bias towards deficit spending is that this 
establishes a depoliticized framework for fiscal policy, 
rather like the depoliticization of monetary policy under 
an inflation targeting regime.
Fiscal responsibility laws have been enacted in 
South American countries such as Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina. In Brazil and Chile they have been fairly 
successful in maintaining fiscal solvency, so far at least, 
and proponents point to this as a vindication of their 
arguments. In Argentina, however, the results have been 
poor, if not non-existent, and the debate does not seem 
to have cast any light on the cause of this difference.
In our view, the argument in favour of fiscal 
responsibility laws expounded in the first two paragraphs 
of this introduction is insufficiently specified. It must 
be explicitly stated, we believe, that countries planning 
to introduce fiscal responsibility legislation need to 
have institutions strong enough to ensure (i) that the 
fiscal rules are precisely formulated, with no room 
for interpretations that distort their goals and (ii) that 
these rules are applied rigorously and in a way that 
is consistent with their provisions, so that neither 
the nation’s executive branch nor lower levels of 
government can subvert it.
Kopits’ argument, for example, touches on this 
issue, but does not clearly point out that the conditions 
he describes cannot simply be assumed to be in place: 
before venturing to pass a fiscal responsibility law, it 
is necessary to check that these conditions have been 
met and to undertake the necessary improvements 
and changes. In the following pages we shall show in 
detail that, at the time fiscal rules were beginning to be 
considered and applied in the region, Argentina was a 
prime example of an institutional context unsuited to 
their successful application.
Furthermore, as will be shown, the fiscal rules 
approved in Argentina have been more in the nature of a 
response to immediate political and economic problems 
than of mechanisms intended to make a permanent 
contribution to fiscal solvency. The flouting of these 
rules has not only revealed the inability of fiscal 
responsibility laws alone to improve fiscal performance 
I
Introduction
“This was the sweet song the Sirens sang, and my heart was filled 
with such a longing to listen that I ordered my men to set me 
free… But they swung forward over their oars and rowed ahead, 
while Perimedes and Eurylochus jumped up, tightened my ropes 
and added more.”
Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII.1
 The authors are grateful for the research assistance provided 
by Ariel Dvoskin and the comments of Juan Pablo Jiménez and 
Cynthia Moskovits.
1 Penguin Classics version (Homer, 2003).
2 See Drazen (2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), two recent 
works which provide a summary of this literature.
3 See, for example, Cukierman (1992).
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Before going further, we need an operational definition 
of fiscal rules. We shall follow Kopits and Symansky 
(1998), for whom a fiscal rule is a permanent (or 
lasting) constraint on fiscal policy expressed through 
fiscal results indicators such as the fiscal deficit, the 
debt level or some component of spending. When we 
speak of fiscal rules in this study, we are referring to 
numerical rules. This is an important point because 
many studies use a broader definition of fiscal rules, 
extending the concept to rules of procedure that govern 
the fiscal policy-making process and transparency rules 
that determine what fiscal information has to be made 
public.4
The same authors argue that some of the key 
variables are: the specific numerical target laid down by 
the rule (it must be clear, measurable and as broad as 
possible); the period over which the rule is to be applied 
(the longer the better); the legal instruments used (of 
the highest status possible, ideally constitutional level); 
the level of government to which they apply (the wider 
the better); and the penalties for non-compliance (the 
harsher the better, ideally including criminal liability for 
officials). The rules usually include “escape clauses” as 
well, i.e., mechanisms that provide flexibility in special 
circumstances to forestall undesirable procyclical 
effects.
The justifications for the establishment of rules 
of this type are set out in the recent economic policy 
literature. This literature attributes differences in fiscal 
behaviour between countries in a similar economic 
situation to differences in political institutions and 
practices. According to Tommasi (1998), the economics 
problems that influence fiscal results can be divided 
into two main categories: principal-agent problems and 
cooperation problems.
In the first category are problems deriving from 
the delegative character of the system of government. 
Voters elect their representatives and delegate to them 
the power to take decisions in the public interest. 
Since information is asymmetrical and the interests 
of representatives do not always coincide with those 
of the represented, the policies made may not always 
be the most desirable. One example in the fiscal area 
is the tendency for governments to increase spending 
in election years.5
Cooperation problems, meanwhile, are those 
arising from the interaction of different national and 
subnational groups in competition for public resources, 
which generates a tendency towards overspending 
and overborrowing. A classic example provided by 
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) shows that 
public spending may increase because of the common 
pool problem involved in the political interaction of 
regions with parliamentary representation. According 
to these authors, legislators have incentives to propose 
spending increases that would benefit their region 
because the resources are raised from taxes levied 
nationwide. Velasco (1999) analyses the common pool 
problem in a dynamic context and shows how it can 
lead to higher deficits and borrowing.
Tabellini and Alesina (1988) explain the fiscal 
deficit by time inconsistency (i.e., a lack of coherence 
in decision-making over time), associated with possible 
discrepancies between the preferences of present and 
future voters and the inability of the former to constrain 
the decisions of the latter. In these circumstances, the 
voters of the present tend to push up spending and 
independently of the institutional context, but has 
actually exacerbated institutional fragility and further 
discredited the legal system in the eyes of society.
Section II of this study summarizes the recent 
literature on the effectiveness of fiscal rules. Section 
III looks at the experience of Argentina with the 
implementation of fiscal rules prior to the passing of 
the fiscal responsibility laws. Section IV then analyses 
their content and section V, lastly, presents some 
conclusions.
II
What are fiscal rules, and what are they for?
4 See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1996). These “rules of 
procedure” are akin to the standards traditionally applied to public-
sector financial administration. 5 See Drazen and Brender (2005) for a recent study of this issue.
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deficits to levels higher than the optimum for society 
as a whole.
The studies mentioned at the beginning of this 
section attribute different fiscal results in countries 
with similar economic institutions and conditions to 
differences in political institutions and practices. In 
particular, the cooperation, time inconsistency and 
principal-agent problems that influence fiscal results 
can vary in different countries and different time 
periods because of changes in political institutions 
that affect the incentives of those who wield the most 
influence over fiscal results. For example, Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) argue that when a country’s budgetary 
process is more hierarchical (the executive has greater 
weight than the legislature, and the finance ministry 
than other ministries), fiscal solvency is greater. This 
is because the president and the finance minister 
are more conscious of the intertemporal budgetary 
constraints on the government than are congress and 
sectoral ministries, and are thus more careful of the 
fiscal results.
These are the arguments that underlie the defence 
of fiscal rules as a mechanism for improving fiscal 
solvency. When political actors have incentives to 
overspend, or a dynamic of non-cooperation leads to 
excessive expenditure, better results should be obtained 
when there is a numerical rule that places a ceiling on 
spending, the deficit or borrowing than when there is no 
such rule. Of course, the basic assumption underlying 
this analysis is that the rule is followed.6
However, it is not easy to find convincing empirical 
evidence of the effect of rules on fiscal results. Braun 
and Tommasi (2004) argue that changes in fiscal rules 
at the national level are not common and that when 
they do occur, they are usually accompanied by other 
reforms that affect the fiscal results, thus making it 
harder to assign responsibility for fiscal changes to 
the alterations in the rules. This problem limits the 
explanatory potential of time series regressions within 
a country, and of regressions using data from a number 
of countries, owing to an insufficiency of observations; 
furthermore, a correlation between changes in rules and 
changes in results would be biased if it failed to take 
account of other reforms.
Given the heterogeneity of the results observed 
following the application of fiscal rules, some authors 
have suggested that, to be successful, such rules need 
to have strong political backing.7 If such were the 
case, however, we would have to ask whether it was 
not this very political support for fiscal discipline 
that was responsible for the improved performance of 
the public finances, irrespective of any formal rules.8 
According to this line of reasoning, fiscal responsibility 
laws are simply a vehicle for building social consensus 
around the importance of fiscal discipline. Without that 
consensus, the rules alone would not guarantee any 
improvement in the behaviour of the public finances.
Given what has happened in Argentina, the lack 
of powerful empirical evidence to demonstrate the 
usefulness of rules in improving fiscal results does not 
surprise us.9 The next section describes the Argentine 
experience with fiscal rules, focusing particularly on 
the 2004 fiscal responsibility law, passed in the first 
half of that year.
6 There are some critical voices in the literature. Milesi-Ferretti 
(2000), for example, argues that numerical rules can lead governments 
to engage in what is known as “creative accounting”, i.e., alter the 
way the public accounts are measured to get a numerical result that 
meets the rule, when the target set by the rule is too demanding for 
the fiscal situation and the level of budgetary transparency is low.
7 See Schick (2002) and Ter-Minassian (2006).
8 If the formal establishment of rules reflected a voter preference for 
fiscal prudence, then the correlation between rules and fiscal prudence 
would suffer from omitted variable bias. The recent academic 
literature has tried to resolve these problems of identification, so 
far without much success.
9 See Gadano (2003) for an analysis of the 1999 fiscal responsibility 
law.
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III
Fiscal rules in Argentina
Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great 
importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to 
add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.10
Argentina overhauled its public-sector f inancial 
administration system in the 1990s, the main element 
in the transformation being the enactment of a 
new public-sector financial administration law (law 
24.156 of September 1992) which redefined roles 
and procedures in the nation’s public finances and the 
operation of supervisory agencies. Structured on the 
principle of normative centralization and operational 
decentralization, the reform assigned the leading role 
to the Ministry of Finance while delegating day-to-day 
budgetary management to the different local authorities 
and agencies. The Comptroller General (SIGEN) was 
given responsibility for internal auditing within the 
executive, while external auditing was assigned to the 
Office of the Auditor-General, which reports to the 
national Congress.11
According to studies of fiscal rules, the reform 
process spearheaded by law 24.156 did not introduce 
quantitative fiscal rules into the administration of the 
public finances but centred on so-called “rules of 
procedure”, i.e., on provisions regulating budgetary 
processes and the administration of public funds.
The introduction of numerical fiscal rules began to 
be discussed in the second half of the 1990s as a result 
of two convergent phenomena. First, a burgeoning 
literature on fiscal rules helped to create an attitude 
favourable to their use. This favourable consensus 
extended to the multilateral lending organizations 
and was reflected in the lists of structural reform 
suggestions proffered by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank to countries with assistance 
and financing programmes.
At the same time, the deterioration in international 
financial conditions towards the end of the decade 
put greater pressure on the performance of emerging 
economies and increased concern about trends in the 
public finances, particularly borrowing.
In Argentina, Congress had passed legislation 
to supplement the 1992 financial administration law. 
Law 24.629, enacted in February 1996, established 
restrictions on spending increases without earmarked 
financing, stricter transparency requirements for the 
budgetary accounts and an obligation for the executive 
to present Congress with a budget implementation 
statement once a quarter and with a progress report 
on the following year’s budget each 30 June. The law 
included a new feature familiar from the debate on 
fiscal rules: penalties for non-compliance. Under the 
new law, officials responsible for breaches of the rules 
would be held personally liable towards third parties.
1. The “fiscal convertibility” law
In 1998, Congress began to debate what would later 
become the first fiscal responsibility law in Argentina, 
law 25.152. Originally labelled the public resources 
administration law, it became known to the public as 
the fiscal convertibility law.12
Discussion of the bill in Congress lasted just over 
a year, during which time macroeconomic conditions 
in Argentina altered sharply, significantly influencing 
its contents. In March 1998, when the original bill was 
submitted, the storm clouds of the international crisis 
that was to affect emerging economies were already 
appearing, but the Argentine economy had just grown 
by 8.1% in 1997 and 6.5% in the first half of 1998. 
A year later, following the impact of the Russian 
crisis and the Brazilian devaluation, Argentina was in 
10 International Publishers version (Marx, 1963).
11 See Makón (1997).
12 The then popularity of the “super rule” of the convertibility regime 
led to an attempt by the creators of the new fiscal legislation to create 
a forcible association between their bill and the currency/monetary 
mechanism that had put an end to inflation in 1991.
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recession, deflationary pressures were becoming more 
and more evident, and concern about the sustainability 
of the public accounts was spreading within and beyond 
the country. The strength of the convertibility system 
was called into question and the fiscal situation was 
seen as one of its weakest links. With an economy 
that had stopped growing and financing difficult to 
obtain, the government had to provide an assurance 
that it would adjust the accounts in future to whatever 
extent necessary, and passing law 25.152 was a good 
way of doing this.13
The numerical rules were the best-known aspect 
of this law. For the financial result, the rule in the 
original bill (a ceiling of 1% for the financial deficit) 
was replaced by a gradual deficit reduction timetable 
starting in 1999 and culminating with fiscal balance in 
2003.14 Public spending growth was made conditional 
on gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the rule being 
that current primary spending could not be raised if 
economic activity declined. A Fiscal Countercyclical 
Fund (FAF) was also established, to be financed out of 
extraordinary concession and privatization receipts and 
a set percentage of tax revenues.15 The original bill also 
included a special article setting out the penalties for 
anyone breaching its provisions. However, they were 
the same as the existing penalties for the offence of 
dereliction of duty by a public official, so the article was 
deemed redundant and removed from the final draft. 
The law also included some considerations concerning 
fiscal transparency and reform of the State.
As was pointed out in the previous section, fiscal 
rules usually include escape clauses to forestall (or 
at least cushion) the procyclical effect that a rigid 
rule might have on fiscal policy, especially during a 
recession. The original bill for law 25.152 contained 
an escape clause that allowed numerical limits to be 
breached “…in cases of severe international crisis, 
catastrophe or internal emergency as determined by the 
executive branch”. This contingency clause disappeared 
from the final version of the law, however. In mid-
1999, the characteristics of the convertibility regime 
and the difficulty of raising public financing made it 
unthinkable for Argentina to increase its fiscal deficit 
as a countercyclical response to the recession affecting 
its economy. On the contrary, all the signs served to 
reinforce the authorities’ commitment to an immediate 
adjustment of the public accounts, even in an adverse 
macroeconomic context. Without a contingency clause, 
the rule required not only that the fiscal deficit be 
eliminated even in periods of recession and deflation, 
but that a Fiscal Countercyclical Fund be set up with 
part of the fiscal revenues.
The results of law 25.152 were disappointing. 
Its implementation in the early 2000s coincided with 
the doomed efforts to prevent the collapse of the 
convertibility regime, which was ultimately abandoned 
in late 2001 in the midst of a deep political, economic 
and social crisis.
The deficit limits laid down in the law were 
modified in its first year of implementation and then 
disregarded. The ceiling on expenditure growth was 
respected in the years of recession (when there were 
no resources to increase spending with), but not in 
those of recovery.16 The Fiscal Countercyclical Fund 
was set up, but it never had the resources to operate in 
the way it was designed to. Although law 25.152 was 
never formally repealed, its resounding initial failure 
consigned it to oblivion.
2. The “zero deficit” law
In the second half of 2001, a few months before 
the political and economic crisis which led to the 
traumatic abandonment of the convertibility regime, 
the authorities tried to implement an extreme fiscal 
rule, far more ambitious in scope than the unenforced 
law 25.152. The new rule, known publicly as the 
“zero deficit law” and formally enacted by a reform 
to financial administration law 24.156, was meant to 
apply a very simple principle: no more should be spent 
13 With a change of president in prospect for late 1999, the promised 
fiscal adjustment would have to be dealt with by the next government, 
a detail of no small importance for the timing of the vote.
14 After setting a ceiling of 1.9% of GDP for 1999, the law established 
a procedure for recalculating that year’s deficit that excluded 
exceptional receipts. On the basis of the recalculated deficit, a 
reduction of 0.4% was mandated for 2000, 0.5% for 2001 and 0.6% 
for 2002, with balance to be achieved in 2003.
15 The FAF could accumulate resources up to a maximum of 3% of 
GDP, to be used during the recessionary phase of the economic cycle. 
De la Sota’s original proposal included an initial contribution to the 
faf using the government’s shares in privatized enterprises. Given 
that the bulk of these shares would be sold in the early months of 
1999, principally those held in Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
(YPF), reference to these resources was dropped in the final version 
of the Countercyclical Fund.
16 Total public spending by the national public sector rose from 15.8% 
of GDP in 2002 to 18.4% in 2006, and the 2007 budget projection 
is for 19.19% of GDP. Primary spending rose from 13.6% in 2002 
to 16.3% in 2006.
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Public interest in the fate of fiscal rules was practically 
nil after the crisis of late 2001. The scale of the problems 
that had to be resolved (suspension of payments on the 
public debt, rescheduling of bank deposits, the breaking 
of public service contracts, high unemployment) meant 
that the flouting of the rules approved by law in 1999 
became a non-priority issue to which few paid attention. 
The disappointing performance of law 25.152 was not 
discussed and still less was any reform mooted, either 
in Congress or in the executive. The law remained in 
force but its prescriptions were not complied with or 
were suspended by articles included in the budget laws 
for each financial year.20
In 2004, however, Congress approved a new fiscal 
responsibility law (FRL) numbered 25.917. The bill was 
sent to Congress by the executive on 15 June 2004, 
entering the House of Senators. Less than two months 
later, it had been passed by both houses of Congress 
and was enacted by the executive. Argentina had a new 
fiscal responsibility law.
The provisions of this law were designed to 
meet a number of objectives. In the interests of fiscal 
transparency, it established an obligation to prepare and 
publish standardized multiyear budgetary information 
for the national government and the provinces. Each 
year, the national government was obliged to present 
a macrofiscal framework that would be used as an 
input for preparing the budget in all administrative 
districts.
each month than could be financed out of current State 
revenues.17
Although simple in its conception, the law proved 
to be wholly impracticable. The executive subjected 
pensions to cuts hitherto applied only to public-sector 
salaries, but did not achieve the much-vaunted “zero 
deficit”. Although the law provided for the adjustment 
coefficient to be increased until the accounts were 
balanced, the scheme’s political and social unviability 
meant that the salary and pension reduction had to be 
held at the original level. Some time later, when the 
convertibility system had collapsed, the zero deficit 
law would be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court of Justice.18
The short, laboured existence of the extreme 
“zero deficit” law dramatically demonstrated how 
impracticable it was to place the whole weight of 
adjustment in the public accounts upon a mere written 
rule. Like law 25.152, the zero deficit law came to swell 
the growing list of unenforced laws in Argentina.19
IV
A new fiscal responsibility law
17 The following text was incorporated into article 34 of financial 
administration law 24.156: “When estimated budgetary resources 
are insufficient to meet all planned budgetary credits, there will be 
a proportionate reduction in credits for the whole of the national 
public sector in order to maintain the balance between operating 
expenditure and budgetary resources. The reduction will affect 
credits intended for the payment of periodic remunerations of any 
type, including salaries, extra pay, family allowances and pensions, 
and transfers used by the receiving organizations or agencies to 
make these payments. The reduction in budgetary credits… will 
automatically entail the reduction of the remuneration affected, 
regardless of type, including salaries, extra pay, family allowances 
and pensions. The reductions in remuneration will be applied 
proportionately throughout the salary or pay scale, as appropriate, 
without discrimination of any kind. This law amends as necessary 
any legal, regulatory or contractual provision to the contrary, and 
the existence of irrevocably acquired rights may not be cited as 
grounds for opposing its operation”.
18 In the judgement “Tobar versus the National State”, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of law 25.453, arguing that it 
was “…contrary to the national Constitution to have a legal regime 
that leaves the determination of pay rates and food allowances to 
the discretion of the executive branch, not as an exceptional case 
that can be subjected to jurisdictional control, but as an economic 
policy tool intended to reduce public spending and stabilize the fiscal 
accounts as passing circumstances may require”.
19 The amendment establishing the zero deficit rule was removed 
from law 24.156 by an article in the 2003 budget act.
20 The Ministry of Finance included articles suspending payments 
into the Fiscal Countercyclical Fund in the 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2006 budget laws. See articles 27 of law 25.565, 40 of 25.827, 30 
of law 25.967 and 24 of law 26.078.
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Regarding numerical rules, law 25.917 set the 
GDP growth rate as the ceiling for primary expenditure 
growth and prescribed budgetary balance after 
deduction of certain types of expenditure.21 For the 
provinces, it established a borrowing constraint whereby 
debt servicing costs might not exceed 15% of the 
current revenues of the local administration concerned, 
after deduction of revenue-sharing (coparticipación) 
transfers to municipalities. All administrations were 
enjoined to create fiscal countercyclical funds.
The national government was empowered to agree 
financing programmes with any provinces that might 
require this, always provided the stipulations of the FRL 
were complied with. The Federal Fiscal Responsibility 
Council was created to oversee the application of the 
law; its members were representatives of the national 
and provincial governments and it was empowered 
to impose penalties for non-compliance that ranged 
from public disclosure of any breaches to the partial 
withholding of budgetary transfers from the centre 
(other than revenue-sharing resources).
A number of provisions in the FRL recapitulated 
limitations already established by law 25.152, which 
was not repealed, and by financial administration 
law 24.156. Although law 25.152 did not have the 
adjustment clause of the FRL, article 2, subsection C 
limited primary public spending growth as a proportion 
of GDP. The prohibition on repaying debts associated 
with expenditure not earmarked in the budget, as 
established in article 24 of the FRL, appears in article 
3, subsection A of law 25.152. The limitations on the 
ability of the executive to increase current spending 
to the detriment of capital spending and financial 
applications during the execution of the budget, 
as stipulated in article 15 of the FRL, reiterate the 
provisions of article 37 of law 24.156. It also repeated 
the ban on creating funds or agencies off budget or 
outside the general financial administration rules. The 
mandate of article 20 of the FRL to create a fiscal 
countercyclical fund is surprising given that a national 
fund with these characteristics, created by law 25.152, 
had been operating for a number of years.
Besides reflecting a certain lack of legislative 
technique, the redundant character of several of the 
provisions in the new FRL confirms something else: 
that the new law owed little to critical reflection on the 
performance of the fiscal rules operating up until that 
time. Given such a recent and traumatic precedent with 
fiscal rules, the debate about a new fiscal responsibility 
norm might have been expected to concentrate on the 
lessons of this earlier experience, seeking at least to 
ascertain why the law had been so poorly enforced. 
Approached in this way, the legislative changes would 
probably have been implemented by reforming existing 
laws and not by creating a new one. However, the 
experience with law 25.152 was not considered when 
the FRL was being prepared and debated in parliament, 
and its text makes no mention at all of the earlier 
legislation. It was other factors, arising from the 
economic and political circumstances of 2004, that 
determined the genesis and content of the FRL.
1. The International Monetary Fund,
 the provinces and the new fiscal 
responsibility law
Two convergent phenomena associated with the 
situation of post-crisis Argentina are to the fore in 
explaining the process that led to the approval of 
the new FRL: the vicissitudes of Argentina’s testing 
relationship with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and the conditional financial assistance provided 
by the central government to the provinces, which 
strongly influenced the substance of the law.
The dynamic of the relationship between Argentina 
and the IMF played a decisive role in the decision to 
enact a new fiscal rule. The IMF financing programme 
for Argentina negotiated in 2001 by Domingo Cavallo, 
a former minister, ended abruptly with the crisis that 
broke out at the end of that year. Following a “short” 
agreement signed by the provisional president, Eduardo 
Duhalde, in January 2003, in September of the same 
year the government of Néstor Kirchner signed a three-
year stand-by agreement providing for disbursements to 
cover Argentina’s debt repayments to the Fund itself.
In the IMF view, fiscal reform (primarily involving 
a new system of federal revenue-sharing) had to be one 
of the main planks of the programme agreed upon.22 
As part of the structural reforms to be implemented, 
the Argentine government undertook to send two bills 
to Congress: a revised tax revenue-sharing law and 
new fiscal responsibility legislation. The accord set 
21 The rule relates to “adjusted” primary expenditure excluding costs 
tied to financing by international organizations and capital spending 
on basic social infrastructure. The same adjustment is to be applied 
when calculating the financial balance. 22 See the statements by Anne Krueger in IMF (2003a).
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out a precise timetable for the initiatives: agreement 
on the principles of the legislation to be passed had 
to be reached with a “critical mass” of governors by 
March 2004.23
Consistently with the conceptual analysis carried 
out in section III, the IMF gave primary importance to 
the approval of new fiscal legislation that included rules. 
In the first programme review in late January 2004, the 
Fund authorities applauded the good performance of 
the Argentine fiscal accounts in the short term, but 
highlighted the need to assure the sustainability of 
fiscal improvements by implementing the promised 
legislative reform.24
In the second review, conducted in March 2004, 
the Fund emphasized the importance it attached to the 
fiscal reform commitments made:
“In addition, progress is expected towards 
securing a political consensus for the new fiscal 
responsibility and coparticipation legislation. 
These are critical initiatives and the authorities 
need to ensure that the reforms that will be 
proposed to Congress provide a durable solution 
for the weaknesses of the current system—namely 
insufficient control over provincial finances, 
lack of incentives to raise own revenues at both 
levels of government, and a lack of equity in the 
distribution of resources among the provinces” 
(IMF, 2004a, pp. 12 and 13).
The Fund continued to wait for the two bills (the 
reform of the revenue-sharing law and the new fiscal 
responsibility legislation) to be submitted to Congress. 
The revised structural targets of the programme 
included an ambitious timetable: submission of both 
bills to Congress by the end of May and their approval 
by the national and provincial legislatures by the end 
of August.
But the federal revenue-sharing reform, the “mother 
of all battles” in the fiscal discussion between the 
national government and the provinces, never reached 
Congress. Sensibly, the national government decided 
not to go ahead with a bill that would necessarily mean 
far-reaching negotiations with the provinces under 
political circumstances that provided no assurance 
of a reasonable outcome. In this context, the new 
fiscal responsibility bill became a sort of second-best 
option�for the Fund because it could present approval 
of the FRL as a step forward with institutional reform 
in the fiscal area, and for the government because 
it prevented the stand-by programme from lapsing. 
Thus, the executive presented the bill for the FRL to 
Congress on 14 June 2004, the same day as the IMF 
mission began the third review of the agreement signed 
in September the previous year.25
The complex fiscal and financial relationship 
between the centre and the provinces, dominated by the 
delayed reform to the federal revenue-sharing regime, 
was significantly affected by the crisis of 2001. A 
number of subnational administrations had increased 
their expenditure and borrowings too far during the 
boom period and were having the utmost difficulty in 
adapting to a less favourable environment. In some 
cases, the financial commitments entered into tied up 
too large a portion of provinces’ revenues. As revenues 
and financing dried up, many administrations had 
resorted to issuing quasi-currencies as the only way 
of meeting basic administration costs, principally the 
salaries of public-sector employees.
By February 2002, the new national government 
had reached a fiscal agreement with the provinces that 
was designed to resolve the most critical aspects of 
the situation.26 The debts of the provinces were taken 
over by the national government and renegotiated over 
long terms and at lower interest rates, and the revenue-
sharing ratios provided for in the legislation once again 
began to be applied. In return for financial assistance 
from the federal government, the administrations in 
the greatest fiscal and financial difficulties undertook, 
under bilateral agreements with the centre known as 
ordered financing programmes (PFOs), to reduce their 
imbalances and not to increase their borrowings.27 
These programmes included financing from central 
government to meet deficits and debt repayments in 
exchange for a commitment to meet fiscal targets for 
reducing budget imbalances by rationalizing spending 
23 See IMF (2003b).
24 IMF (2004b).
25 The third review was never completed and the stand-by programme 
was suspended. The Fund was dissatisf ied with a number of 
“weaknesses” in the new fiscal responsibility legislation (IMF, 2005).
26 Acuerdo Nación-Provincias sobre Relación Financiera y Bases de 
un Régimen de Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos, signed on 27 
February 2002 and ratified by national law no. 25.570.
27 The Programme for Ordered Financing of the Provincial Finances, 
aimed at the provincial states and the autonomous city of Buenos 
Aires, was formally created by national executive decree no. 2.263 
dated 8 November 2002.
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and increasing revenues, refraining from any debt 
or quasi-currency increases, and carrying out fiscal 
transparency and financial administration reforms. To 
ensure that the loans received were reimbursed, the 
provinces agreed to transfer their rights over federal 
revenue-sharing resources to the national government. 
The agreements included penalties for non-compliance 
by the provinces.28
The ordered f inancing programmes strongly 
influenced the contents of the 2004 FRL, which became 
a means to give greater institutional backing to the 
bilateral financing agreements between the national 
government and the provinces.29 On the basis of article 
26 of that law, the national government carried on 
signing agreements with some provinces and even using 
the same financial vehicle, the Trust Fund for Provincial 
Development (FFDP).30 The FRL shares with the 
ordered financing programmes the goal of capping the 
provinces’ public debt, and the two instruments contain 
similar penalties for non-compliance. Most of the fiscal 
management and transparency requirements laid down 
in the PFOs subsequently reappeared in the text of the 
FRL. The coordination and oversight role exercised in 
the PFOs by the deputy minister for provincial relations 
was transferred to the Fiscal Responsibility Council 
created by the new legislation.
The relationship between the national government 
and the provinces was an issue that permeated the 
contents of the FRL but does not seem to have been 
critical in the timing of its approval. It may be speculated 
that, without the pressure from the Fund to pass the 
FRL, financial assistance to the provinces would have 
continued to be administered through PFOs.
2. The operation of the 2004 fiscal 
responsibility law (FRL)
At this early stage, the record of the new law has 
been mixed. As public revenues have grown along 
with economic activity, Argentina has significantly 
improved its fiscal accounts in recent years. However, 
during the 2005 fiscal year, the first to be affected by 
the FRL, the most important numerical rule of the new 
law was not met: adjusted primary spending grew by 
more than GDP.31
In the provinces, the Federal Fiscal Responsibility 
Council found that the spending and balance rules were 
met in 2005, although some administrations exceeded 
the borrowing limits.32 Looking ahead, the executive 
is seeking to change the method used to measure the 
limits on spending increases in the provinces to exclude 
specifically allocated expenditure financed from non-
automatic federal government contributions, with effect 
from 2007. If this amendment goes through, the FRL 
will be completely debased.33
The limits on the amendments the executive can 
make to the budget while it is being implemented, as 
laid down in article 15 of the FRL, were suspended 
temporarily by an article in the 2005 budget act voted 
through just a few months after this law had been 
passed, and permanently by means of a controversial 
reform to the financial administration law passed in 
mid-2006.34
There has been no progress, at least at the national 
level, in the aim of consolidating into the budget all the 
agencies and/or funds that are currently off budget.35
There has likewise been no progress with the 
publication of fiscal information as required by article 
7 of the law. In the case of the national public sector, 
information on budget implementation, the public debt 
28 The national government signed PFOs with 17 provinces in 2002, 
providing financing of 2.73 billion pesos to cover cash needs and 
public debt repayments. On a similar basis, PFOs were once again 
signed in 2003 (with financing of over 3 billion pesos from the 
national government) and 2004 (Cetrángolo and Jiménez, 2004).
29 The Minister of Economy, Roberto Lavagna, publicly confirmed 
the connection between the new law and the ordered financing 
programmes (PFOs): “We see a case for bringing together a large 
part of the experience of these last three years in a law of a more 
permanent character. The idea behind this law is that all of us, in 
the national government and in the provinces, should work with 
common macroeconomic rules and projections, and with standards 
of transparency and coordination” (Lavagna, 2004).
30 The FFDP, created by decree in 1995 to support reforms in 
the provincial states, began to be used as a provincial financing 
instrument by the national government in 2000 and 2001. The FFDP 
was also the means used to transfer the resources promised by the 
PFOs in 2002, 2003 and 2004, the funds being provided by the 
Treasury. In the last few years, the FFDP has been the instrument used 
to give the provinces the assistance provided for in the FRL.
31 See ASAP (2005).
32 See Consejo Federal de Responsabilidad Fiscal (2006).
33 The change was included in article 20 of the 2007 budget bill 
presented to Congress. The system introduces perverse incentives: 
the provinces would be limited in their scope to increase spending 
out of their own resources (or their share of tax revenue-sharing 
income), but could do so using financing from discretionary central 
government transfers.
34 This is law 26.124 of August 2006, which amended article 37 of 
law 24.156, increasing the powers of the executive to amend the 
budget voted through by Congress during its implementation.
35 Article 3 of the FRL set a deadline of two years for these funds 
and agencies to be brought into the general budget. They have not 
been reincorporated in the 2007 budget bill, but an article has been 
added to this calling for “a timetable of activities for the completion 
of this inclusion process”.
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In Argentina, prodigality in the use of fiscal rules (two 
different laws in just five years) contrasts with the 
meagre results achieved. The rules have been all but 
ineffective in assuring the sustainability of fiscal policy, 
improving transparency and rooting out the collection 
of bad practices that have dominated the Argentine 
budgetary process for years.
The rapid and general neglect of the rules 
contained in the first fiscal responsibility law approved 
in Argentina (law 25.152 of 1999, known as the fiscal 
convertibility law) was largely associated with the 
macroeconomic crisis that broke out in late 2001. Five 
years later, however, in highly favourable economic 
circumstances, compliance with the provisions of the 
2004 fiscal responsibility law, many of them carried 
over from the earlier legislation, is also poor. The 
improvement in Argentina’s macrofiscal indicators since 
the 2001 crisis is due to a set of convergent factors 
(new taxes, faster growth, inflation, restructuring of 
the public debt) and cannot be attributed to the passing 
of the 2004 FRL. As a proportion of GDP, the national 
primary fiscal result in 2005 was over 1% lower than 
in the previous year and, as mentioned earlier, the rule 
that is most important for a period of expansion like 
the one Argentina is currently experiencing was not 
followed: the limitation of spending growth.37
In contexts of institutional weakness like that 
in Argentina, where the executive amends laws with 
surprising frequency and ease, it is hard to imagine 
that a fiscal responsibility law might significantly 
constrain the decision-making of those in government, 
to the extent of correcting the pattern of behaviour in 
the public finances.38
As was mentioned in section II, some authors 
have argued that the great virtue of fiscal responsibility 
laws may simply be that they provide society with 
vehicles for building political consensus around the 
need to ensure the solvency of the public sector. In 
Latin America, the experience of Chile is revealing: the 
Chilean public sector was already meeting the structural 
fiscal surplus target of 1% of GDP several years before 
this was announced as a rule.39
and unfunded Treasury debt is being delayed by more 
than the three months allowed by the FRL. Occupational 
and employment information is not available. The 
Federal Fiscal Responsibility Council has started to 
publish information from the provinces, but this is 
incomplete and there are long delays.
Contrary to the terms of article 13 of the law, 
new funds have been created with associated spending 
that is not consolidated in the general budget. Article 
17, which creates an obligation to offset any revenue-
reducing tax measure by increasing resources elsewhere 
or reducing spending, has not been complied with.36
In summary, a preliminary assessment of compliance 
with the rules established in the FRL paints an unpromising 
picture that is reminiscent of the situation with its 
predecessor, law 25.152, in the early years of the decade. 
Despite the stark contrast in macroeconomic conditions 
at the time each came into force (extremely adverse for 
25.152, favourable for the FRL), in neither case has the 
government (or public opinion generally) shown much 
interest in enforcing the rules established.
V
Conclusions
36 In mid-March 2006, the executive amended the rules on minimum 
thresholds for profits tax liability without presenting any offsetting 
measure.
37 The primary result fell from 4.04% of GDP in 2004 to 2.98% 
in 2005. The financial result fell from 2.6% to 0.68% in the same 
period.
38 Eifert, Gelb and Borje (2002) have studied the use of stabilization 
funds and other budgetary reforms in different countries with 
abundant oil resources, and have concluded that in countries deemed 
to be “factional democracies” (a category in which they include 
Argentina and other countries of the region) these schemes do not 
work properly unless they have strong political support.
39 The Chilean rule has another striking characteristic which contrasts 
with the recommendations of the literature: it is not based on any 
legal or constitutional instrument whatsoever. See Marcel (2006) 
and Vial (2003).
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In Argentina, parliamentary debates on fiscal 
responsibility bills have not been associated with an 
in-depth public discussion of the importance of fiscal 
discipline. Despite the traumatic earlier experience, the 
FRL was debated for less than two months in Congress 
and no reflections and/or discussions on the issue were 
forthcoming from other sectors with close connections 
to the public finances.
Far from being treated as tools for regulating 
long-term fiscal policy, the rules have been used to 
respond to short-term needs, with an evident lack of 
concern about their subsequent performance. In 1999, 
the drafters of law 25.152 took to its limit the idea of 
the “fiscal rule as signal” (Drazen, 2002) in an effort 
to convey an unyielding commitment by the authorities 
to the convertibility regime.
In 2004, however, it seemed foolish to imagine 
that passing a new fiscal responsibility law could 
provide a positive signal about the fiscal commitment of 
the authorities. With public debt repayments suspended, 
the credibility of the Argentine Treasury had fallen 
very low and was unlikely to be improved by a new 
law from Congress offering yet another promise of 
fiscal discipline.
So why was the FRL passed? Despite having no 
potential whatsoever as a “signal”, the law was useful 
for other goals being pursued at the time, chiefly that 
of ensuring the viability of the stand-by agreement then 
in force between Argentina and the IMF. The Fund was 
keeping up its recurrent pressure for the approval of 
structural reforms, especially in the fiscal area, but the 
Argentine authorities saw how unhelpful it would be to 
force along the debate on reform of the tax revenue-
sharing regime. Securing a fiscal responsibility law that 
was lauded in academic circles and by the multilateral 
agencies became an honourable way out for Argentina 
and the IMF negotiators. From the Argentine perspective, 
passing the new fiscal responsibility law would be a 
positive step if it gave greater viability to the programme 
with the IMF, while it would also serve to institutionalize 
the bilateral financial assistance programmes with the 
provinces the old ordered financing programmes.
Looking ahead, this analysis of events leads us 
to the paradoxical recommendation that Argentina 
should once again reopen the legislative debate on 
fiscal responsibility. The legislation now in force is so 
confused that the rules need to be consolidated and 
organized, probably in a single body of law. The aim 
should not be to produce a third fiscal rule in response 
to a temporary predicament or to the wishes of some 
multilateral organization, but to rationalize the existing 
legislation, stripping it of redundant provisions and of 
objectives that are unlikely to be attained.
This rationalization of the fiscal responsibility 
legislation could be an opportunity to generate a broad 
public debate on the advantages of fiscal discipline 
and budgetary good practice, involving all sectors of 
politics and society with an interest in the subject. 
Even if formally less ambitious, a review of the fiscal 
legislation that yielded a consensus on the subject in 
society would surely have far more beneficial effects 
on the performance of the public accounts.
Regionally, the Argentine experience should also 
provide a warning to the multilateral organizations, 
which are only too ready to include the approval of a 
fiscal rule among the conditions they lay down in their 
assistance programmes. In countries with low fiscal 
credibility and weak institutions, not only may rules 
prove completely ineffective in fiscal terms, but non-
enforcement may further weaken the fragile institutional 
environment that undermined their effectiveness in the 
first place.40 Perhaps it is the multilateral organizations 
that should follow a new rule: do not press for the 
approval of fiscal rules in countries that establish them 
only in order to obtain the financing these organizations 
can provide.
(Original: Spanish)
40 Vial (2003) examines the problems that have arisen with the 
implementation of IMF-sponsored laws creating fiscal rules in Peru 
and Ecuador.
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